al-qu'ida training manual al-quida training manual al qaeda training manual
thetulsan.com's official analysis of

The Declaration of Jihad Against the Country's Tyrants
'Al Queda Training Manual'


PREFACE

in which thetulsan.com states its case
THE COVER

a picture tells a thousand words
ADMONITION

'pretty, PRETTY please with C4 on top'
PLEDGE, O SISTER

to chop the nads off mutilating cavemen
FEAR ALLAH

we're watching you
INTRODUCTION

reiterating the jihad against the Rotary Club
INTRODUCTION P.5

in which p.1-4 are missing
PRINCIPLE OF MILITARY ORG

How to Play Army
IMPORTANCE OF MILITARY ORG

handy for developing that stale resume
QUALIFICATIONS/REQUIREMENTS FOR MEMBERS

a history of surprisingly flexible standards
COUNTERFEIT CURRENCY AND FORGED DOCUMENTS

beyond the Kinko's standard
MILITARY BASES: APARTMENT PLACES - HIDING

where digging trenches is encouraged
COMMUNICATION/TRANSPORTATION

what life was like before email and cell phones
TRAINING/TRAINERS

do NOT forget to bring a toothbrush
IN PROGRESS

updates soon . . .
GLOSSARY OF COMMON TERMS

a mere handful of useful terms


PREFACE

The following text is a British translation (UK/BM-19 TRANSLATION) of an Arabic document recovered from a 'safe house' in England during a suspected terrorist cell take-down. Titled The Declaration of Jihad Against the Country's Tyrants, it was reportedly discovered in 2000 from the residence of one Nahihal Wadih Rashie in Manchester, UK. This manual has been posted on about 6,000 websites and is labeled as the Al Queda Training Manual. Generally regarded as the sole piece of reference material available to the general public regarding the inner workings of Al Queda, an analysis/commentary on The Manual has not been offered.

One should approach any such information from internet sources with great caution. However, the manual was INTRODUCED AS EVIDENCE en toto by the State of New York in the trial of the infamous 1998 Embassy bombing suspects, and was not challenged. The contents were also primary reference material for international terrorism expert Rohan Gunaratna's Inside Al Queda. The Department of Justice references its contents as actual Al Queda material.

This is CERTAINLY NOT the 'Encyclopedia of the Afghan Jihad.' That tome is a 7,000 page volume available only to higher-level operatives (its explosives section alone is 200 pages, or longer than the 'Al Queda Training Manual'), and is available on CD.

Prefaced with the admonishment to not remove the Declaration from the safe house it was assigned to, the Manual is more of a review of operating principles learned in the training camps. Directed to the operatives in third world countries, the title suggests its creation for a specific country. That country being any country an Al Queda sympathizer live.

There are numerous books that 'go inside' Al Queda, a few that purport to 'reveal' deeep background on the September 11, 2001 plot, and others that detail the spectre of Islamic fascism. Having read several of these, it is apparent that they are all drawing from essentially the same source material and body of facts related to the recent history of Al Queda-sponsored activities.

This started as an effort to educate the average citizen about the tactics and organizational structure of the terrorist organization for the express purpose of EMPOWERING THAT CITIZEN TO TAKE THE NECESSARY STEPS TO EXPOSE POTENTIAL TERRORISTS, AND BRING THAT SUSPECT AND THE SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY TO THE AWARENESS OF THE PROPER LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES. Since its inception some years after 2001 - they all run together - America has gone on a worldwide war against terrorism, developed immense bloated agencies that seem more designed against the average citizen than against terrorists.

The 'Manual' as such is available through CRYPTOME.ORG, and gif images of the manual on THESMOKINGGUN.COM.


The purpose of this effort is to deconstruct the methods, tactics, and idealogy of the Al Queda network. Awakened by the discovery that thetulsan.com is a leading entry when an internet search is conducted for said manual, thetulsan.com has placed this effort on its highest priority. Make no doubt, the Almighty has sanctioned this work, and will see that it prospers. See? Like right now!

Many have counseled caution in relation to this endeavor. Some are concerned that thetulsan.com will become a target for zealous counterterrorism agents, others that thetulsan.com will become a target for the terrorists and their sympathizers.

As for the former, thetulsan.com sincerely hopes that federal and state law enforcement officials are able to use this material to better instruct and embolden their efforts. Consider: the Oklahoma Highway Patrol conducts a law-enforcement course for its cadets. one week is devoted to investigation, interrogation, surveillance, and various other aspects of police work. Three weeks are devoted to martial arts. The defining issue in this War on Terror is not about detecting terrorist cells, it is about engineering the physical custody of the evildoers. Unfortunately, much of this effort will be fighting back the fifth column of appeasers and sympathizers who will make this a much more dangerous, protracted process than it need be.

The success of our government in preventing further acts of terrorism on US soil should not be overlooked or understated, especially inasmuch as it is the cheif provacateur of violence in the world today, and more than often stands by silently while terrorists/secret agents operate And for any Mujahid who have stumbled upon these words: we beseech you to air your grievances and injustices to your leaders, to practice nonviolent civil protest.


ANALYSIS OF THE AL QUEDA TRAINING MANUAL
aka Declaration of Jihad against the Country's Tyrants

The Yee-haw Jihad!
a picture tells a thousand words

Having taken Afghanistan, the mujahadin returned to their homelands as heroes, their zeal validating the belief that the power of Muslims faithful to the da'wa, strong enough to repudiate a force mighty as the Soviet Union could change the world. These freedom fighters were lionized, and told their tales of battle to eager ears the world over, encouraging the young to fight and the newly, fabulously wealthy Young Turks in the Gulf to support their work.

The simple, hand-sketched image projects that sense of excitement and holy adventure. The artist either had a slight case of stigmatism, or did not want this special project to end: the spacing of the lines is irregular, but becomes increasingly closer spaced toward the bottom of the page.

None of the translations of the Declaration translate the cover, but one may expect that somewhere it says 'Declaration of Jihad against the Country's Tyrants.' While possession of reading material, tapes, or propaganda posters that extol the virtues of jihad may not identify a terrorist agent, such material does make the owner a likely candidate for recruitment as a collaborator of the military arm of Al-Queda (aka 'the Organization.')


ADMONITION

In the name of Allah, the merciful and compassionate: To those champions who avowed the truth day and night . . . and wrote with their blood and sufferings these phrases: The confrontation that we are calling for with the apostate regimes does knot know Socratic debates, Platonic ideals, nor Aristotelian diplomacy. But it knows the dialogue of bullets the ideals of assassination, bombing, and destruction, and the diplomacy of the cannon and machine-gun.

Islamic governments have never and will never be established through peaceful solutions and cooperative councils. They are established as they always have been by pen and gun, word and bullet, tongue and teeth.

In the name of Allah, the merciful and compassionate, [this manual] belongs to the guest house, please do not remove it from the house except with permission.



pretty, PRETTY please do not remove

Eschewing effete philosophy is typical of revolutionaries, and from the beginning the authors want to impress on the reader that WE MEAN BUSINESS. But the admonition asks PLEASE not to remove the manual.

It is meant to. The yin-yang see-saw of opposing forces in the refrains hides a secret message to the operative: if you remove this manual, YOU WILL DIE. In fact, any deviation from strict orders during the selection process will remove oneself from consideration for inclusion in the Organization's operations.


PLEDGE O SISTER:

To the sister believer whose clothes the criminals have stripped off. To the sister believer whose hair the oppressors have shaved. To the sister believer who's body has been abused by the human dogs.

PLEDGE O SISTER:

Covenant, O Sister, to make their women widows and their children orphans. Covenant, O Sister, to make the desire death and hate appointments and prestige. Covenant, O Sister, to slaughter them like lambs and let the Nile, al-Asi, and Euphrates rivers flow with their blood. Covenant, O Sister, to be a pick of destruction for every godless and apostate regime. Covenant, O Sister, to retaliate for you against every dog who touch you even with a bad word.



chop the nads off mutilating cavemen

There is no evidence of women being recruited or trained by Al Queda, so it is surprising to see this admonition at the beginning of the manual. Why include this rather lengthy discourse to women who will never read those words?

To reinforce the purpose of the jihad, yes (depose secular Egyptian regime, purge Iraq of dissidents), to protect the chastity of Muslim women, and to cause a visceral reaction in the male reader. Some dirty talk. To the simple-minded (and those utterly deprived of images of the female form), this kind of talk is QUITE risque.

It would have been nice for the authors to clearly condemn sabi, a tactic used by the Armed Islamic Group of Algeria (GIA) to inspire fear among Muslims opposed to their idealogy. Sabi is 'temporary marriage' to justify raping women whose husbands they had killed.

O Sister, pledge to chop the nads off any goon that seeks to 'practice' Female Genital Mutilation on your beautiful children. O Sister, pledge to say to your husbands bent on martyrdom, "Hey, what am I? You can't even do the dishes and satisfy ME and you think ALLAH is going to give YOU 76 chickies to oppress for eternity?" [ SMACK! ]

Fundamental Muslims will express extreme reluctance to interact with women, and may show open contempt for Westernized women.


FEAR ALLAH

In the name of Allah, the merciful and compassionate: Thanks be to Allah. We thank him, turn to him, ask his forgiveness, and seek refuge in him from our wicked souls and bad deeds. Whomever Allah enlightens will not be misguided, and the deceiver will never be guided. I declare that there is no god but Allah alone; he has no partners. I also declare that Mohammed is his servant and prophet.

"O ye who believe! Fear Allah as He should be feared, and die not except in a state of Islam."

"O mankind! Fear your guardian lord who created you from a single person. Created, out of it, his mate, and from them twain scattered [like seeds] countless men and women; fear Allah, through whom ye demand your mutual rights, and be heedful of the wombs [that bore you]: for Allah ever watches over you."

"O ye who believe! Fear Allah, and make your utterance straightforward: That he may make your conduct whole and sound and forgive you your sins. He that obeys Allah and his messenger, has already attained a great victory."

Afterword, the most truthful saying in the book of Allah and the best guidance is that of Mohammed, God bless and keep him. [Therefore] the worst thing is to introduce something new, for every novelty is an act of heresy and each heresy is a deception.



we're watching you

The belief that fundamentalist Muslims want to return the world to a seventh century existence is given credence in the last paragraph if one believes that 'novelties' are modern conventions. But the 'innovations' are alternate theologies to Allah's revelation to the Prophet.

Many detractors of Islam gloss over the importance of its monotheism, Semitic base, and flexible practices. They deny that Allah is the same God of the Christians and Jews, and that God would honor their faith. (Good thing the Apostle Paul did not take that view when he preached to the worshippers at the altar of the unknown God.)

Of course, Islam (meaning 'submission to Allah's will') is quite clear in its rejection of other doctrines, and its praxis is quite unique. Islam exists to procure 'equal rights' for believers? Interesting: why equal rights? Because of an inherent inferiority complex the Moslem psyche is exposed to regarding its own, awkward origins. Ishmael was the scapegoat for Abraham's unbelief, while Isaac was blessed with the full birthright. (This is addressed in the Christian gospel, in whom there is no Jew or Gentile.) Muslims can feel the same yearning for union with God that all people do, and seek forgiveness and to live holy lives in obedience to His will. Moslem-o-phobes should recognize this human commonality before issuing one syllable about comparative religion.

And to reinforce that the safe houses (and most certainly the agent's theological chastity) are most definitely being monitored by both covert and overt agents: 'Allah watches over you.' Subtext: 'You're in it now pal, don't even think of thinking for yourself. Stray from Islam, just a lil' bit . . .' The inclusion of the admonition is just another threat to its agents under the guise of brotherly friendliness, the threat and promise of an omniscient hierarchy leading all the way to Mr. Big.


INTRODUCTION

Martyrs were killed, women were widowed, children were orphaned, men were handcuffed, chaste women's heads were shaved, harlot's heads were crowned, atrocities were inflicted on the innoncent, gifts were given to the wicked, virgins were raped on the prostitution altar.

After the fall of our orthodox caliphates on March 3, 1924 and after expelling the colonialists, our Islamic nation was afflicted with apostate rulers who took over in the Moslem nation. Moslems have endured all kinds of harm, oppression, and torture at their hands.

Those apostate rulers threw thousands of the Harak Al-Islamyia (Islamic Movement) youth in gloomy jails and detention centers that were equipped with the most modern torture devices and [manned with] experts in oppression and torture. Those youth had refused to move in the rulers' orbit, obscure matters to the youth, and oppose the idea of rebelling against the rulers. But they did not stop there; they started to fragment the essence of the Islamic nation by trying to eradicate its Moslem identity. Thus, they started spreading godless and atheistic views among the youth. We found some that claimed that socialism was from Islam, democracy was the religious council, and the prophet - God bless and keep him - propagated communism. Colonialism and its followers, the apostate rulers, then started to openly erect crusader centers, societies, and organizations like Masonic Lodges, Lions, and Rotary clubs, and foreign schools. They aimed at producing a wasted generation that pursued everything that is western and produced rulers, ministers, leaders, physicians, engineers, businessmen, politicians, journalists, and information specialists.

"And Allah's enemies plotted and planned, and Allah too planned, and the best of planners is Allah."

They tried, using every means and seduction, to produce a generation of young men that did not know anything except what they want, did not say except what they think about, did not live except according to their way, and did not dress except in their clothes. However, majestic Allah turned their deception back on them, as a large group of those young men who were raised by them woke from their sleep and returned to Allah, regretting and repenting.

The young men returning to Allah realized that Islam is not just performing rituals but a complete system: Religion and government, worship and jihad, ethics and dealing with people, and the Koran and the sword. The bitter situation that the nation has reached is a result of the its divergence from Allah's course and his righteous law for all places and times. That came about as a result of its children's love for the world, their loathing of death, and their abandonment of Jihad.

Unbelief is still the same. It pushed Abou Jahl - may Allah curse him - and Kureishi's valiant infidels to battle the Prophet - God bless him and keep him - and to torture his companions - may Allah's grace be on them. It is the same unbelief that drove Sadat, Hosni Mubarak, Gadhafi, Hafez Assad, Saleh, Fahed - Allah's curse be upon the non-believing leaders - and all the apostate Arab rulers to torture, kill, imprison, and torment Moslems.

These young men realized that an Islamic government would never be established except by the bomb and rifle. Islam does not coincide or make truce with unbelief, but rather confronts it. The confrontation that Islam calls for with these godless and apostate regimes, does not know Socratic debates, Platonic ideals, or Aristotelian diplomacy. But it knows the dialogue of bullets, the ideals of assassination, bombing, and destruction, and the diplomacy of the cannon and machine gun.

The young came to prepare themselves for jihad, commanded by the Majestic Allah's order in the holy Koran: 'Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power, including steeds of war, to strike terror into the hearts of the enemies of Allah and your enemies, and others besides whom ye may not know, but whom Allah doth know.'

I present this humble effort to these young Moslem men who are pure, believing, and fighting for the cause of Allah. It is my contribution toward paving the road that leads to majestic allah and establishes a caliphate according to the prophecy.

According to Imam Ahmad's account, the prophet [ unintelligible - untranslated Hadith text ]



reiterating the jihad against the rotary club

Again, the author uses shocking imagery to get the reader's attention.

Having seen the fall of the Russian Monarchy and other central European dynasties, Turkey abolished the caliphate and established a representative form of government. Straddling Asia and Europe, Turkey exhibited the careful wisdom that had allowed them to maintain their line of succession since 1299, and chose a path of modernization and inclusion.

This did not sit well with the socialists, Marxists, and those who espoused a restored pan-Arab empire of Moslem believers (Haraka Al-Islamyia, the progenitors of today's Wahabists). Each of the groups had hoped that the caliphate would resist modernization, and die a death of a thousand cuts like the Czar did. Much to the chagrin of the fundamentalists it didn't, creating instead a prosperous, free society.

For the well-educated Moslem, it is an affront that their culture, once the most learned and accomplished on the planet, has devolved into a dreadful backwater, a living anachronism. Who do they blame? The Westernized Arab. This fear of evolving into a modern society via an invasion of denatured expatriats mirrors the convulsions of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, Stalinist Russia, and Nazi Germany. Each based its foundation upon a romantic worldview of the country's simpler, more bucolic past, and a fear and loathing of the West.

Seems the fundamentalist Moslems have the same enemies as evangelical Christianity: Marxist revisionists, who teach that the Early Church was communist, and that modern Christians share a burden to take up arms to free the people from tyranny. It is also incorrect (though not as wildly) to assign democratic ideals to the sura majlis (religious councils, where most tribal and doctrinal decisions occur) than it would to the College of Cardinals picking out a new Pope. Democracy is as natural to the human condition as tribal government, the natural conclusion humans come to when we attempt to create civil societies. Christian fatalists should consider this commonality before condemning Moslem countries to despotism and tyrannical rule.

We are all scarred by the Twentieth Century, which was, in retrospect, as bloody a time as could have ever occurred. Heavy-handed regimes suppressed popular movements in brutal ways. Much of the third world lives in feudal societies, and the rage of being landless, uneducated, starving, where human life appears as cheap as dirt, and, But foremost in the oppression was their ability to control thought itself. The reeducation of the Westernized Arab included derision of any form of modernity, from the decadent culture to the pillage of the third world by corporations. These are just 'devices' used by the Crusaders in their attempt to invade the Holy Lands.

The praxis (application of theological principles to one's social context), is emphasized again for the reader, and once Jihad is defined as armed revolution to the exclusion of other definitions, the call becomes natural, transcending political boundaries as the 'nation' refers now to Arabic-speaking Moslems. Detractors who preach that armed revolution is the only definition Moslems may apply to jihad, that "terrorists are good Muslims," are racist pigs, on equal par with the xenophobic trogolodytes attempting to persuade the manual's to blow himself up.

The targets of the revolutionaries are a hit parade of people that have offended Al Queda's leadership for any number of reasons, some of which may have occurred hundreds of years ago. Condemned are the secular, Baathist regimes (Qhadafi al-Libya, Assad al-Syria), communists (Saleh al-Yemen), or the previously extolled monarchists (Fahed al-Saud). NOTABLY absent is Saddam Hussein, the single greatest butcher of Moslems in the twentieth century. Hmmmm.

AQ rejects 'Western' thought (which Arabs may lay as equal claim to as anyone else), but why reject logic? For the same reason the madrasas teach students the Koran in Arabic, even if the student does not speak Arabic. The greater the mystery, the greater the reliance the students and followers have on the leaders. Again, reinforcing the futility of individual thought, the reader is reminded that Allah knows all, and if you want to die in a state of Islam, you will do as we say.

The hadith is an account of Mohammed's deeds and sayings and help form the second leg of sharia, or Islamic law.


FIRST LESSON: GENERAL INTRODUCTION

5. We cannot resist this state of ignorance unless we unite our ranks, and adhere to our religion. Without that, the establishment of religion would be a dream or illusion that is impossible to achieve or even imagine its achievement. Sheik Ibn Taimia - may Allah have mercy on him - said "The interests of all Adam's children would not be realized in the present life, nor in the next, except through assembly, cooperation, and mutual assistance. Cooperation is for achieving their interests and mutual assistance is for overcoming their adversities. That is why it has been said, 'man is civilized by nature.' Therefore, if they unite there will be favorable matters that they do, and corrupting matters to avoid. They will be obedient to the commandment of those goals and avoidant of those immoralities. It is necessary that all Adam's children obey."

He [Sheik Ibn Taimia] then says, "It should be understood that governing the people's affairs is one of the greatest religious obligations. In fact, without it, religion and world affairs could not be established. The interests of Adam's children would not be achieved except in assembly, because of their mutual need. When they assemble, it is necessary to have a leader. Allah's prophet - God bless and keep him - even said 'If three people come together, let them pick a leader.' He then necessitated the rule by one of a small, non-essential travel assembly in order to draw attention to the remaining types of assembly. Since Allah has obligated us to do good and avoid the unlawful, that would not be done except through force and lording. Likewise, the rest of what he obligated would not be accomplished except by force and lordship, be it Jihad, justice, pilgrimage, assembly, holidays, support of the oppressed, or the establishment of boundaries. That is why it has been said 'the sultan is Allah's shadow on earth.'



The UK/BM-10 TRANSLATION is a mystery, as well. Is the sudden appearance of the fifth point of the general introduction a clever code inserted by the original authors, are the first four unintelligible, or did Scotland Yard find them irrelevant? We will never know. The lead-in indicates that further discourse was offered regarding the state of apathy the fundamentalists perceived in Westernized Arab youth.

Ibn Tamiyya belongs to the salafa, or the first three generations of followers of Allah via Mohammed.

The reference to Adam may surprise many, but Moslems will trace their roots to the same source as Christians and Jews. Again, cooperation, assembly, and assistance is condoned as long as it conforms to da'wa, and is not the Sesame Street values that many American youth are taught: that those values exist as an end to themselves. The unity espoused is not unity for unity's sake, but unified in the call to re-establish the caliphate.

Again, there is no distinction between belief and action, where 'governing' is a religious obligation, quite undemocratic: if an assembly of three choose (but not elect!) one of their number to forfeit power to, how much hope can we have that fundamental Islamists will see the value of self-governance? In their worldview, this would lead to destruction as a natural course of events.

The purpose of the jihad is not to merely create a unified state of Moslems, but a worldwide body of believers declaring allegiance to one man whose word will be reckoned as seriously as if Allah himself said so, whose decrees will be absolute.

Thetulsan.com has not studied the hadith to analyze the travelling assemblies the Prophet commissioned to illustrate leadership principles, but believe this would lend additional clues to Al Queda's terrorist cell structure.


PRINCIPLES OF MILITARY ORGANIZATION

Military Organization has three main principles without which it cannot be established.
1. Military Organization commander and advisory council.
2. The soldiers (individual members)
3. A clearly defined strategy

Military Organization Requirements: The Military Organization dictates a number of requirements to assist it in confrontation and endurance. These are:
1. Forged documents and counterfeit currency
2. Apartments and hiding places
3. Communication means
4. Transportation means
5. Information
6. Arms and ammunition
7. Transport
Missions Required of the Military Organization:
The main mission for which the Military Organization is responsible is:
The overthrow of the godless regimes and their replacement with an Islamic regime.
Other missions consist of the following:
1. Gathering information about the enemy, the land, the installations, and the neighbors.
2. Kidnapping enemy personnel as well as foreign tourists.
3. Assassinating enemy personnel as well as foreign tourists.
4. Freeing brothers who are captured by the enemy.
5. Spreading rumors and writing statements that instigate people against the enemy.
6. Blasting and destroying the places of amusement, immorality, and sin; not a vital target.
7. Blasting and destroying the embassies and attacking vital economic centers.
8. Blasting and destroying bridges leading into and out of the cities.



Are the three main principles listed in order of importance? You betcha! The most important thing to Al Queda's leadership are their own sorry butts. They are the Alpha Males, and take every opportunity to reinforce that, including here. The soldiers are also listed, but merely as a means of implementing number three. Again, the rigid authoritarian structure dictates allegiance, not thought. The mission is only incidental to the fact that the brothers are all Moslems.

The strategy, the overriding purpose, is to undermine 'godless regimes,' the tactic is to use covert agents to commit acts of terror. Command and control is the ability to control the authority and direction of a strategy by specific commanders over an array of resources to fulfill that strategy. Operatives, tools, communications, and safe-houses under close management accomplish a mission during five distinct phases: 1. PLANNING 2. PRE-OPERATIONAL 3. OPERATIONAL 4. EXECUTION 5. POST-OPERATIONAL.

Sanctioned activity ranges anywhere from petite vandalism to murder, to wanton bombing. In this, we get the first real hint that the manual was designed for the third world, as operatives are encouraged to view tourists and simple pieces of infrastructure as worthwhile targets. Places of 'immorality et al' are also targeted, but why not vital? Because the real source of corruption is seen as the illegitimate regime.

Armed with these priorities, operatives compile a list of targets and observe their defenses, operating procedures, et al (including videotaping and taking pictures of the target area) and report to their handler what they have found. This is the their first purpose, to be an extra pair of eyes for the omniscient organization.

For such a narrow list one may be surprised that 5 ('rumours' & 'instigating') is a military objective. Disinformation is an act of war, a tactic used to undermine the regime. The fact Al Queda-aligned agents have infiltrated Moslem NGO's is indisputable, and they should be encouraged to voice their opinion inasmuch as they expose their allegiance.

As these missions are listed in no discernible order, they possibly were arranged in the original Arabic for easier memorization.


IMPORTANCE OF THE MILITARY ORGANIZATION

1. Removal of those personalities that block the call's path. All type of military and civilian intellectuals for the State.
2. Proper utilization of the individuals' unused capabilities.
3. Precision in performing tasks, and using collective views on completing a job from all aspects, not just one.
4. Controlling the work and not fragmenting it or deviating from it.
5. Achieving long-term goals such as the establishment of an Islamic state and short-term goals such as operations against enemy individuals and sectors.
6. Achieving the conditions for possible confrontation with the regresive regimes and their persistence.
7. Achieving discipline in secrecy and through tasks.



'Hmm . . . yeah boss, I got his application right here. Looks good. He'll go head to head with anyone, real tenacious, won't take no for an answer. THAT's what I was thinking, too!

'Fairly diverse job skills, always taking classes, likes to accept new assignments. What's that? Oh, yeah, no kidding!

'Let's see what else. A real team player, pays attention to detail. Focused, reaaal goal oriented, linear but not inflexible. See? Didn't I tell you? Looks like he'll focus on the major competition first, pick off the little guys in the process. What's that? Very loyal, yes, no loose lips, here.

'Uh-huh. Yeah. Sure, then, I'll get a letter ready, give him a call: Looks like we got ourselves a new Sales Manager!'


SECOND LESSON: NECESSARY QUALIFICATIONS AND CHARACTERISTICS FOR THE ORGANIZATION'S MEMBERS

Necessary Qualifications for the Organization's Members:
1. ISLAM: The member of the Organization must be Moslem. How can an unbeliever, someone from a revealed religion, a secular person, a communist, etc. protect Islam and Moslems and defend their goals and secrets when he does not believe in that religion? The Israeli Army requires that a fighter be of the Jewish religion. Likewise, the command leadership in the Afghan and Russian armnies requires any one with an officer's position to be a member of the communist party.
2. COMMITMENT TO THE ORGANIZATION'S IDEALOGY: This commitment frees the Organization members from conceptual problems.
3. MATURITY: The requirements of military work are numerous, and a minor cannot perform them. The nature of hard and continuous work in dangerous conditions requires a great deal of psychological, mental, and intellectual fitness, which are not usually found in a minor. It is reported that Ibn Omar - may Allah be pleased with him - said, 'During Ahad [battle] when I was fourteen years of age, I was submitted to the prophet - GBAKH. He refused me and did notr throw me in the battle. During Khandak [trench] Day [battle] when I was fifteen years of age, I was also submitted to him, and he permitted me.'
4. SACRIFICE: He has to be willing to do the work and undergo martydom for the purpose of achieving the goal and establishing the religion of majestic Allah on earth.
5. LISTENING AND OBEDIENCE: In the military, this is known today as discipline. It is expressed by how the member obeys the orders given to him. That is what our religion urges. The Glorious says 'O ye who believe! Obey Allah and obey the messenger and those charged with authority over you.' In the story of Hazifa Ben Al-Yaman - MAHMOH - who was exemplary in his obedience to Allah's messenger - ABAKH - sent him to spy on the Kureish and their allies during their siege of Madina, Hazifa said "As Mohammed called me by name to stand he said 'Go get me information about those people and do not alarm them about me.'" As I departed, I saw Abou Soufian and I placed an arrow in the bow. I remembered the words of the Messenger - ABAKH - 'do not alarm them about me.'
6. KEEPING SECRETS AND CONCEALING INFORMATION: [secrecy is important] . . . even with the closest people, for deceiving enemies is not easy. Allah says "Even though their plots were such that as to shake the hills!" Allah's messenger - GBAKH - says, 'Seek Allah's help in doing your affairs in secrecy.'
It was in the proverbs 'The hearts of freemen are the tombs of secrets' and 'Moslems' secrecy is faithfulness, and talking about it is faithlessness.' [Mohammed] - GBAKH - used to keep work secrets from the closest people, even from his wife A'isha - MAGBOH.
7. FREE OF ILLNESS: The Military Organization's member must fulfill this important requirement. Allah says 'There is no blame for those who are infirm, or ill, or who have no resources to spend.'
8. PATIENCE: [member] should have plenty of patience for afflictions if he is overcome by the enemies. He should not abandon this great path and sell himself and his religion to the enemies for his freedom. He should be patient in performing the work, even if it lasts a long time.
9. TRANQUILITY AND UNFLAPPABILITY: [he] should have a calm personality that allows him to endure psychological traumas as those involving bloodshed, murder, arrest, imprisonment, and reverse psychological traumas such as killing one or all of his Organization's comrades. [he should] carry out the work.
10. INTELLIGENCE AND INSIGHT: When the prophet - ABKH - sent Hafiza Ben Al-Yaman to spy on the polytheist and Hafiza sat among them, Abou Soufian said 'Let each of you look at his companion, 'Who are you?' The companion replied, 'So-and-so son of so-and-so.'

In World War I, the German spy, Julius Seelber [PH] managed to enter Britain and work as a mail examiner due to the many languages he had mastered. From the letters, he suceeeded in obtaining important information and sent it to the Germans. One of the letters that he checked was from a lady who had written to her brother's friend in the fleet. She mentioned that her brother used to live with her until he was transferred to a secret project that involved commercial ships. When Seelber read that letter, he went to meet that young woman and blamed her for her loose tongue in talking about military secrets. He, skillfully, managed to draw out of her that her brother worked in a secret project for arming old commercial ships. These ships were to be used as decoys in the submarine war in such a way that they could close to the submarines, as they appeared innocent. Suddenly, cannonballs would be fired from the ship's hidden cannons on top of the ships, which would destroy the submarines. 48 hours later that secret was handed to the Germans.

11. CAUTION AND PRUDENCE: In his battle against the king of Tomedia, the Roman general Speek sent an emissary to discuss with that king the matter of truce between the two armies. In reality, he had sent him learn about the Tomedians' ability to fight. The general picked Lilius, one of his top commanders, for that task and sent with him some of his officers, disguised as slaves. During that mission, one of the king's officers, Sifax pointed to one of the slaves and yelled, 'That slave is a Roman officer I had met in a neighboring city. He was wearing a Roman uniform.' At that point, Lilius used a clever trick and managed to divert the attention of the Tomedians from that by turning to the disguised officer and quickly slapping him on the face a number of times. He reprimanded him for wearing a Roman officer's uniform when he was a slave and for claiming a status he did not deserve. The officer accepted the slaps quietly. He bowed his head in humility and shame, as slaves do. Thus, Sifax's men thought that officer was really a slave because they could not imagine that a Roman officer would accept these hits without defending himself.

King Sifax prepared a big feast for Lilius and his entourage and placed them in a house far away from his camp so they could not learn about his fortifications. They [the Romans] made another clever trick on top of the first one. They freed one of their horses and started chasing him in and around the camp. After they learned about the extent of the fortifications they caught the horse and, as planned, managed to abort their mission about the truce agreement. Shortly after their return, the Roman general attacked King Sifax' camp and burned the fortifications. Sifax was forced to seek reconciliation.

B. There was a secret agent who disguised himself as an American fur merchant. As the agent was p laying cards aboard a boat with some passengers, one of the players asked him about his profession. He replied that he was a 'fur merchant.' The women showed interest and began asking the agent many questions about the types and prices of fur. He mentioned fur price figures that amazed the women. They started avoiding and regarding him with suspicion, as though he were a thief or crazy.
12. TRUTHFULNESS AND COUNSEL: The Commander of the faithful, Omar Ibn-Khattab - MABAKH - asserted that this characteristic was vital in those who gather information and work as spies against the Moslems' enemies. He sent a letter to Saad Ibn Abou Wakkas - MABPWH - saying, ' If you step foot on your enemies' land, get spies on them. Choose those whom you count on for their truthfulness and advice, whether Arabs or inhabitants of that land. Liars' accounts would not benefit you, even if some of them were true; the deceiver is a spy against you and not for you.'
13. ABILITY TO OBSERVE AND ANALYZE: The Israeli Mossad received news that some Palestinians were going to attack an Israeli El Al airplane. That plane was going to Rome with Golda Meir - ACUH - the Prime Minister at the time, on board. The Palestinians had managed to use a clever trick that allowed them to wait for the arrival of the plane without being questioned by anyone. They had beaten a man who sold potatoes, kidnapped him, and hidden him. They made two holes in the top of that peddler's cart and placed two tubes next to the chimney through which two Russian-made 'Strella' missiles could be launched. The Mossad officers traveled the airport back and forth looking for the Palestinians. One officer passed the potato cart twice without noticing anything. On his third time, he noticed three chimneys, but only one of them was working with smoke coming out of it. He quickly steered toward the cart and hit it hard. The cart overturned and the Palestinians were captured.

(This story is found in the book 'By Way of Deception' by Victor Ostrovsky. The author claims that the Mossad wanted to kill him for writing that book. However, I believe that the book was authorized by the Israeli Mossad.)

14. ABILITY TO ACT, CHANGE POSITIONS, AND CONCEAL ONESELF a. Noaim Ibn Mosoud had done in his mission to cause agitation among the tribes of Koraish, those of Ghatfan, and the Jews of Korethia. He would control his reactions and managed to skillfully play his role. Without showing signs of inconsistency, he would show his interest and zeal towards the Jews one time and show his concern about the Koraish at another.
b. In 1960, a car driven by an American colonel collided with a truck. The colonel lost consciousness, and while unconscious a the hospital, he started speaking Russian fluently. It was later discovered that the colonel was a Soviet spy who was planted in the United States. He had fought in Korea in order to conceal hs true identity and to gather information and critical secrets. If not for the collision, no one would have suspected or confronted him.



At this point the operative has made the 'cut.' However, once selected as a covert or overt cell member, further testing and initiation is conducted in the field. In one test, a member is directed to wait in a safe house for further instruction and then observed. One agent was reportedly sent home after merely pulling the curtains aside to peek outside.

The reference to the 'Afghan armies' dates the Manual to the early 90's, before the Russian puppet government in Kabul was brought down by the Taliban.

The qualifications are mislabeled, as the call to Islam is secondary to the commitment to the Organization. 'Conceptual problems' may include questioning the morality of killing babies and women. They may include wondering whether the Jihad as called for by the Organization's leadership is truly justified. These problems include any 'innovation' or idea that has not emanated from the leadership.

If it would serve the purposes of the Organization, the leadership would declare that any living being capable of waddling forward with C4 strapped to them are mature enough to perform an operation. If the individual is committed to the Organization, willing to martyr him/herself, the Organization is more than willing to accept that person despite that person's age, mental capacity, or gender.

The purposes of the Organization are primary, and obedience to Allah is reflected in the unquestioning commitment to the Organization. Here, Hafiza had a clear shot at Soufian, a military target of high value, but subjugated that written goal to the oral orders of command and control. The seamlessness through which the military and religious commandments of Islam are directed at the believer is seen again, where Allah himself commands secrecy.

An illness that would exclude a member from inclusion in membership depends on the needs of Al Queda, and the severity of the illness. Osama himself has a crippling liver disease, but his skill set and membership level excludes him from this requirement.

The 'unflappability' alluded to here escapes many of the top operatives captured to date, who tend to fold like cheap suitcases when interrogated. When captured, deeep background indicates they spill the beans faster than one can say 'dipped in pig's blood.' Why is this? Because the schema they have developed is so fragile, so thin in pretext, that it cannot stand up to logical dissection. That and, again, they want to save their own sorry hides.

The 'reverse psychological trauma' of killing one's mates should be executed, one supposes, with peaceful dedication. Reasonable speculation has evolved which states that many, if not most, of the September 11, 2001 hijackers did not realize they were on a martyrdom operation. Scant evidence, to be sure, but this line of thought centers around the fact that few outside the pilots had made funeral arrangements, final wills, or other instructions.

Intelligence and insight is also a curiously flexible requirement. Zacharias Moussai spent roughly $40k in flight lessons but could not muster the skill set to pilot a passenger liner. A converted ex-con, Jose Padilla, a man with no propensity to understand or to access nuclear materiel, was tasked to explore creating a 'dirty-bomb.' Another genius, Lyman Faris, a trucker, was tasked to case the Washington Bridge in NY to comment on the feasibility of blowing it up. Oh, yeah, Al Queda attracts the best and the brightest, all right.

The tale of the German spy encapsulates everything the cell member will ever be taught about the history of western civilization. Here, the crafty Germans have infiltrated the treacherous British as the limeys prepare an underhanded decoy operation. Typical of their sneering dislike of women, here a woman stupidly spills the beans of this top-secret operation. There is no evidence outside of this manual of this spy existing or of this operation.

The tale of the Roman officer again emphasizes anti-Jewish, Christian-killing forces as superior to their enemies. How the story relates to caution and prudence is just another example of how badly Al needs a better PR committee. If anything, this story relates the consequences of imprudence and a lack of caution. Sending one's top commanders into the enemy's camp is anything but cautious; once having been 'outed,' one would anticipate the slaves would try to lay low, but not in Neverland: here they loose a horse and run all around the camp chasing it down! We can only hope that cell members practice such caution and prudence during the planning phases of their operations.

History says they do. Prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks, several of the hijackers were spending freely in a strip club in Florida, bragging about something that was going to happen very soon. In San Antonio, post September 11, 2001, three Islamists were repeating this behavior, saying they were going to attack local military bases. Atta himself made a veiled threat to blow up buildings in Washington to a Department of Agriculture employee following a rejection of a loan for crop-dusters. A calendar distributed in mosques in Denmark featured a crashing plane for the month of September, 2001 with the New York skyline in the background. A week before the attacks, an Islamic youth in New Jersey, following an argument in class, pointed to the WTC towers saying that 'next week they will be gone.'

It is human nature to share secrets, to let others think that one is more important because of some special, divine status. This trait is amplified in the terrorists because they are convinced that the average Western schmo is dull, stupid, so bereft of discernment that the operatives can flaunt their plans openly and will not be challenged. Al Queda's pattern of refusing to take credit for operations may reinforce this propensity of the individual operative to want to brag about his status.

In the halcyon days of the cold war, the average citizen would indeed merely discount the case of the secret agent 'fur trader' as a nut or thief. In the Age of Terror, such discrepancies need to be probed, questioned politely, drawn out with dumb, friendly smiles. The worse case scenario is that one is perceived as a nosey xenophobe, while the best case scenario is that the suspect makes a damning revelation.

There is a fine line to be walked for the average citizen intent on sleuthing on someone that perks his/her interest. There is a 100% chance that terrorists in America will interact with an unsuspecting citizen today in the most innocuous of ways. There is virtually no chance that it will be you or I. It is a certainty that covert agents have used fake identification to procure some essential good or service, but certainly not from you or anyone you know.

The Organization recognizes that a sensitive operation will typically not be compromised by the long-term investigation of a cell per se, but through simple mistakes on the part of the operatives. Ramsey Yousef, mastermind of the original WTC bombing, was compromised by a small explosion in his apartment in the Phillipines, and a female police officer on her way home heard the call and went just to 'check it out.'

Recent (11.21.03) rocket attacks from donkey carts in Baghdad indicate that this manual is quite well-read, indeed. They also indicate that cars, trucks, and safe places near high-value targets are all but useless at this point for launching attacks. The sneering disregard for their enemies' capabilities is seen here again: Ostrovsky's book is seen as a Mossad deception, despite the charge that the Mossad suppressed information that would have stopped the infamous Beirut barracks bombing. No Jew can be trusted in Al Quedaland, even rogue agents, and no Israeli security personnel could EVER tell the difference between a smoke stack and a rocket tube.

The use of subterfuge, alias', false identities et al has been used during the entire history of warfare. Ibn Masoud's use of such is predictable. Remember Mission 5? 'Spreading rumours and writing statements that instigate people against the enemy'? Here, Masoud triangulates the Jews and the Koraish tribes, pitting them against each other. Overt agents of Al Queda will appear publicly as apologists for Islamist revolutionaries, attacking those who question their fascism. Their goal is to buy time for the covert agents to develop workable operations, using the Modernist's fear of being labeled narrow-minded to detract potential busybodies from prying into their affairs too closely.

The story of the 'colonel' is without merit, and reinforces how stoopid Al Queda believes its enemies are. As with the German spy, there is no evidence of this incident having taken place. Thetulsan.com believes that the writer mistakenly blended a 'Get Smart' episode with the end of 'Patton' and somehow came up with this. Again: Americans stoopid. Enemies crafty.


THIRD LESSON: COUNTERFEIT CURRENCY AND FORGED DOCUMENTS

Financial Security Precautions:
1. Dividing operation funds into two parts: One part is to be invested in projects that offer financial return, and the other is to be saved and not spent except during operations.
2. Not placing operation funds in one place.
3. Not telling the Organization members about the location of the funds.
4. Having proper protection while carrying large amounts of money.
5. Leaving the money with non-members and spending it as needed.

Forged Documents (ID cars, record books, passports):The following security precautions should be taken:
1. Keeping the passport in a safe house so it would not be seized by the security apparatus, and the brother it belongs to would have to negotiate its return (I'll give you your passport if you give me information.)
2. All documents of the undercover brother should be falsified.
3. When the undercover brother is traveling with a certain identity card or passport, he should know all pertinent information such as the name, profession, and place of residence.
4. The brother who has special work status (commander, communication link, etc) should have more than one identity card and passport. He should learn the contents of each, the nature of the profession, and the dialect of the residence area listed in the document.
5. The photograph of the brother in these documents should be without a beard. It is preferable that the brother's public photograph be also without a beard. If he already has one showing a photograph with a beard, he should replace it.
6. When using an identity document in different names, no more than one such document should be carried at one time.
7. The validity of the falsified travel documents should always be confirmed. All falsification matters should be carried out through the command and not haphazardly (procedural control).
8. Married brothers should not add their wives to their passports.
9. When a brother is carrying the forged passport of a certain country, he should not travel to that country. It is easy to detect forgery at the airport, and the dialect of the brother is different from that of the people from that country.
10. Security Precautions Related to the Organizations' Given Names:
The name of the Organization should not be odd in comparison with other names around him.
11. A brother should not have more than one name in the area where he lives (the undercover work place.)



Al Queda has a separate Finance Committee that looks over the collection, dispersal, and recovery of funds. The Finance Committee may have contributed this section of the manual: note that where the agent was previously called 'member,' he is now being referred to as 'brother,' indicating a different writer.

This section is supposedly dedicated to 'Counterfeit Currency,' so it is puzzling why no further reference is made to 'funny money.' The mismatch between title and content may be caused by a poorly translated original text, and may speak to the need for more well-trained Arab translators.

The Finance Committee will be involved in large-scale counterfeit operations, while members of the Military Committee (ie covert agent) will be secondary conduits for laundering that cash. Counterfeit currency will be converted in third world nations into goods and used as operational funds for the military.

Credit card fraud remains the single greatest source of ready cash and supplies for operatives. They will often pass themselves off as wealthy businessmen or well-heeled students, and attempt to use this prestige to cow simple clerks into cutting corners and bending rules. In many hotels, first-time guests have their ID's photocopied, and most banks are exercising more caution in relation to wire transfers and new accounts.

The theory that the manual is directed at agents in third world countries is reinforced by the emphasis on the agent's 'dialect', which is of less concern in Oklahoma City than in Peshawar, where a Morrocan is as obvious to the hotel clerk as someone from Boston is at the Three Frogs Lounge.

Item four describes the command and control of the Organization. Command flows from the Caliph's (Bin Laden) majlis (advisory council), to the respective Committee, to the Committee's anqud (cluster), to the individual cell commanders, to the individual cell members (aka Mr. Etc).

The inability of Westerners to pronounce Arab names or point out obvious mismatches (eg 'Lequisha Rockefeller') is a strong suit for the operatives in conducting simple matters (bank accounts, renting vehicles) for which they will use false identities. One should go to great pains to confirm the spelling and pronunciation of all names, politely inquiring what part of the Gulf region the individual hails from. Dispel the notion that, to the Ugly American, 'all Arabs look alike'.

Appearing Westernized and un-Islamic is important as it will deflect cursory scrutiny (unless one is a FRENCH screener, for whom Richard Reid seems normal). Shaving one another's pubic hair in an airline toilet should be avoided, but NO WARNING HERE because the intuitive terrorist would NEVER do THAT.


FOURTH LESSON: ORGANIZATION MILITARY BASES 'APARTMENT PLACES' & HIDING

Definition of Bases: These are apartments, hiding places, command centers, etc. in which secret operations are executed against the enemy. These bases may be in cities, and are called homes or apartments. They may be in mountainous, harsh terrain far from the enemy, and are called hiding places or bases. During the initial stages, the Military Organization usually uses apartments in cities as places for launching assigned missions, such as collecting information, observing members of the ruling regime, etc.

Hiding places and bases in mountains and harsh terrain are used at later stages, from which Jihad groups are dispatched to execute assassination operations of enemy individuals, bomb their centers and capture their weapons. In some Arab countries such as Egypt, where there are no mountains or harsh terrain, stages of Jihad work would take place in cities. The opposite was true in Afghanistan, where initially Jihad work was in the cities, then the warriors shifted to mountains and harsh terrain. There, they started battling the Communists.

Security Precautions Related to Apartments

1. Choosing the apartment carefully as far as the location, the size for the work necessary (meetings, storage, arms, fugitives, work preparation).
2. It is preferable to rent apartments on the ground floor to facilitate escape and digging of trenches.
3. Preparing secret locations in the apartment for securing documents, records, arms, and other important items.
4. Preparing ways of vacating the apartment in case of surprise attack (stands, wooden ladders).
5. Under no circumstances should any one know about the apartment except those who use it.
6. Providing the necessary cover for the people who frequent the apartment (students, workers, employees, etc.)
7. Avoiding seclusion and isolation from the population and refraining from going to the apartment at suspicious times.
8. It is preferable to rent these apartments using false names, appropriate cover, and non-Moslem appearance.
9. A single brother should not rent more than one apartment in the same area, from the same agent, or using the same rental office.
10. Care should be exercised not to rent apartments that are known to the security apparatus [such as] those used for immoral or prior Jihad activities.
11. Avoiding police stations and government buildings. Apartments should not be rented near those places.
12. When renting these apartments, one should avoid isolated or deserted locations so the enemy would not be able to catch those living there easily.
13. It is preferable to rent apartments in newly developed areas where people do not know one another. Usually, in older quarters people know one another and strangers are easily identifies, especially since these quarters have many informers.
14. Ensuring that there has been no surveillance prior to the members entering the apartment.
15. Agreement among those living in the apartment on special ways of knocking on the door and special signs prior to entry into the building's main gate to indicate to those who wish to enter that the place is safe and not being monitored. Such signs include hanging out a towel, opening a curtain, placing a cushion in a special way, etc.
16. If there is a telephone in the apartment, calls should be answered in an agreed-upon manner among those who use the apartment. That would prevent mistakes that would, otherwise, lead to revealing the names and nature of the occupants.
17. For apartments, replacing the locks and keys with new ones. As for the other entities (camps, shops, mosques) appropriate security precautions should be taken depending on the entity's importance and role in the work.
18. Apartments used for undercover work should not be visible from higher apartments in order not to expose the nature of the work.
19. In a new apartment, avoid talking loud because prefabricated ceilings and walls do not have the same thickness as those in old ones.
20. It is necessary to have at hand documents supporting the undercover [member]. In the case of a physician, there should be an actual medical diploma, membership in the union, the government permit, and the rest of the routine procedures known in that country.
21. The cover should blend well. For example, selecting a doctor's clinic in an area where there are clinics, or in a location suitable for it.
22. The cover of those who frequent the location should match the cover of that location. For example, a common laborer should not enter a fancy hotel because that would be suspicious and draw attention.



We are again in deep gratitude to the UK translators for the 'Apartment Places' and 'Hiding' translation. Of course the original did NOT read 'Apartments and Hiding Places' as written in the text.

Mountains and rural areas used at later stages because once an attack is launched 'safe places' are no longer, well, safe. Each Arab neighborhood, no matter the density or size of the city, is very like a small town in America, and the regime will have at least one pair of eyes on each block, in each apartment building, and if need be, on each floor.

The 'security precautions related to apartments' direct agents to take steps that have zero meaning in the modern world, unless one is prepared to dig trenches, of course.

The manufacture of bombs (WHUPS! 'Improvised Explosive Devices' aka IED's) would seemingly require a semi-rural locale, and a spy-proof garage or courtyard for maximum privacy, conducted with absolute discretion, but not in Al Quedaland. This excerpt from The Cell sums up a typical Third World secret 'safe house' operation:

"The house at number 9 Jabal al Sakhra Street in Aden is a two-story cinder-block affair with an ornate blue door. It isn't much of a building. The room that served as sleeping quarters, with its felt rug and foam pads, offered little in the way of amenities. But the place had one perk that added to its charm and made it operationally essential to the man who rented it beginning in June. For $50 a month, it offered a spectacular view of Aden Harbor.
"The new tenant paid four months' rent in advance . . . They could study how long it took the huge [US Navy] ships to enter the harbor and how long it took them to refuel. From the two windows in the front of the house, they could even see how close small boats were allowed to get to the battleships.
"The two men wore beards, appeared to be in their late twenties and said little to their neighbors other than claiming to work among the harbor's fishmongers. That was an explanation that made their comings and going in the predawn hours seem normal. It was also an explanation that washed, if anyone noticed, with them owning a small boat. At least one of the men carried a well-worn copy of the Koran, yet neither he nor his friend were ever seen as the small white mosque just a few paces up the hill.
"Within days of the attack, the Yemeni Security Service had found and interviewed a crucial witness . . . The men gave Amed a hundred Yemeni riales, or less than a dollar, to keep an eye on their trailer, then waved good-bye and motored off in their bomb-boat to blow up the Cole. Amed's story was passed on by his older brother to Yemeni authorities, who located the trailer and a Nissan truck . . . traced to a house on a quiet upper-middle-class street in Burayqah, a neighborhood just a short drive from downtown Aden. Neighbors said the men who lived there would often play soccer with the local kids on a dusty street in the late afternoon. By day, however, they had kept to themselves, staying inside or working in the yard on what appeared to be a boat engine. During the last few days before the Cole bombing, the men were seen working at a frenetic pace. At first, the neighbors, who could not see into the yard, had been merely curious. Later they had complained about the noise. The neighbors said the men spoke with an accent common to the Hadramaut region of Northern Yemen, bin Laden's ancestral homeland."

The tone of the advice is clear: discretion, privacy, and normalcy are the operative's tools for success. Aaaaand yet, as Ramsi Yousef and co. were preparing for World Trade Center I . . . "On February 25, Salameh, posing as Kamal Ibrahim, took delivery of three tanks of compressed oxygen . . . Forbidden to bring them inside the facility - storage workers felt they were too hazardous - Salameh called on Yousef to help transport the tanks back to THEIR APARTMENT [emph thetulsan], where they completed assembly of the bomb that afternoon." (again from The Cell.)

Nor do the operatives take seriously the need for secret hiding places. "Moussaoui was found in possession of two Model 400 and Model 200 flight manuals for a Boeing 747 Model 400, notes referring to a handheld GPS receiver and a camcorder, a handheld aviation radio, a notebook listing two German phone numbers and the name of Ahad Sabet, letters from Infocus Tech and a computer disk containing information relating to the aerial dispersal of pesticides." - Inside Al Queda.

Puzzling is the reference to a 'doctor's clinic.' If there is a need for congruence between the operative's cover and knowledge base, one may infer that Al Queda's ranks will include well-educated, professional, operatives.


FIFTH LESSON: MEANS OF COMMUNICATION AND TRANSPORTATION

In the name of Allah, the merciful and compassionate:
MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION
It is well-known that in undercover operations, communication is the mainstay of the movement for rapid accomplishment. However, it is a double-edged sword: It can be to our advantage if we use it well and it can be a knife dug into our back if we do not consider and take the necessary security measures.
COMMUNICATION MEANS
The Military Organization in any Islamic group can, with its modest capabilities, use the following means: 1.The telephone 2.Meeting in-person 3.Messenger 4.Letters 5.Some modern devices, such as the facsimile and wireless.

Communication may within the country, state, or even the country, in which case it is called local communication. When it extends between countries, it is called international communication.

SECRET COMMUNICATION IS LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING TYPES
1. COMMON: It is a communication between two members of the Organization without being monitored by the opposing security apparatus. The common communication should be done under a certain cover and after inspecting the surveillance situation.
2. STANDBY: This replaces common communication when one of the two parties is unable to communicate with the other for some reason.
3. ALARM: Used when the opposing security apparatus discovers an undercover activity or undercover members. Based on this communication, the activity is stopped for a while, all matters related to the activity are abandoned and the members are hidden from security personnel.

METHODS OF COMMUNICATION AMONG MEMBERS OF THE ORGANIZATION
1. Communication about undercover activity should be done using a good cover; it should also be quick, explicit, and pertinent. That is, just for talking only.
2. Prior to contacting his members, the commander of the cell should agree with each of them separately (the cell members should never meet all in one place and should not know one another) on a manner and means of communication with each other. Likewise, the chief of the Organization should use a similar technique with the branch commanders.
Cell or cluster methods should be adopted by the Organization. It should be composed of many cells whose members do not know one another, so that if a cell member is caught the other cells would not be affected, and work would proceed normally.
3. A higher-ranking commander determines the type and method of communication with lower-ranking leaders.

FIRST MEANS: THE TELEPHONE
Because of significant technological advances, security measures for monitoring the telephone and broadcasting equipment have increased. Monitoring may be done by installing a secondary line or wireless broadcasting device on a telephone that relays the calls to a remote location. That is why the Organization takes security measures among its members who use this means of communication.
1. Communication should be carried out from public places. One should select telephones that are less suspicious to the security apparatus and are more difficult to monitor. It is preferable to use telephones in booths and on main streets.
2. Conversation should be coded or in general terms so as not to alert the person monitoring.
3. Periodically examine the telephone wire and receiver.
4. Telephone numbers should be memorized and not recorded. If the brother has to write them, he should do so using a code so they do not appear as telephone numbers (figures from a shopping list, etc.)
5. The telephone caller and person called should mention some words or sentences prior to brining up the intended subject. The brother who is calling may misdial one of the digits and actually call someone else. The person called may claim that the call is for him, and the calling brother may start telling him work-related issues and reveal many things because of a minor error.
6. In a telephone conversation about undercover work, the voices should be changed and distorted.
7. When feasible, it is preferable to change telephone lines to allow direct access to local and international calls. That and proper cover facilitate communications and provide security protection not available when the central telephone station in the presence of many employees is used.
8. When a telephone is identified, the command and all parties who were using it should be notified as soon as possible in order to take appropriate measures.
9. When the command is certain that a particular telephone line is being monitored, it can exploit it by providing information that misleads the enemy and benefits the work plan.
10. If the Organization manages to obtain jamming devices, it should use them immediately.

SECOND MEANS: MEETING IN-PERSON
This is direct communication between the commander and a member of the Organization. During the meeting the following are accomplished.
1. Information exchange 2. Giving orders and instructions 3. Financing 4. Member follow-up

STAGES OF THE IN-PERSON MEETING
A. BEFORE THE MEETING
1. Designating the meeting location.
A. For stationary meetings:
i. The location should be far from police stations and security centers.
ii. Ease of transportation to the location.
iii. Selecting the location prior to the meeting and learning all its details.
iv. If the meeting location is an apartment, it should not be the first one, but one somewhere in the middle.
v. The availability of many roads leading to the meeting location. That would provide easy escape in case the location were raided by security personnel.
vi. The location should not be under suspicion.
vii. The apartment where the meeting takes place should be on the ground floor, to facilitate escape.
viii. The ability to detect any surveillance from that location.
ix. When public transportation is used, one should alight at some distance from the meting location and continue on foot. In the case of a private vehicle, one should park it far away or in a secure place so as to be able to manuever it quickly at any time.
B. If the meeting location is not stationary, the following matters should be observed:
i. The meeting location should be at the intersection of a large number of main and side streets to facilitate entry, exit, and escape.
ii. The meeting location (ie a coffee shop) should not have members that might be dealing with the security apparatus.
iii. The meeting should not be held in a crowded place because that would allow the security personnel to hide and monitor those who meet.
iv. It is imperative to agree on an alternative location for the meeting in case meeting in the first is unfeasible. That holds whether the meeting place is stationary or not.
C. Those who meet in-person should do the following:
i. Verifying the security situation of the location before the meeting.
ii. Ensuring that there are no security personnel behind them or at the meeting place.
iii. Not heading to the location directly.
iv. Clothing and appearance should be appropriate for the meeting location.
v. Verifying that private documents carried by the brother have appropriate cover.
vi. Prior to the meeting, designing a security plan that specifies what the security personnel would be told in case the location were raided by them, and what the brothers would resort to in dealing with the security personnel (fleeing, driving back . . .)
2. Finding a proper cover for the meeting. The cover:
i. should blend well with the nature of the location.
ii. should be believable to security personnel if they conduct a raid.
iii. should not arouse the curiosity of those present.
iv. should match the person's appearance and his financial/educational background.
v. should have documents that support it.
vi. Should provide reasons for the meeting (eg: one of the parties should have proof that he is an architect. The other should have documents as proof that he is a land owner. The architect has produced a construction plan for the land).
3. Specifying the meeting date and time.
i. Specifying the hour of the meeting as well as the date.
ii. Specifying the time of both parties' arrival and the time of the first party's departure.
iii. Specifying how long the meeting will last.
iv. Specifying an alternative date and time.
v. Not allowing a long period of time between making the meeting arrangements and the meeting itself.
4. Defining special signals between those who meet.
If the two individuals meeting know one another's shape and appearance, it is sufficient to use a single safety sign. The sitting and arriving individuals inform each other that there is no enemy surveillance. The sign may be keys, beads, a newspaper, or a scarf. The two parties would agree on moving it in a special way so as not to attract the attention of those present.
IF THE INDIVIDUALS DO NOT KNOW ONE ANOTHER, THEY SHOULD DO THE FOLLOWING:
a. The initial sign for becoming acquainted may be both of them wear a certain type of clothing or carry a certain item. These signs should be appropriate for the place, easily identified, and meet the purpose. The initial sign for becoming acquainted does not identify one person by another. It does that at a rate of 30%.
b. Safety Signal: It is given by the individual sitting in the meeting location to inform the second individual that the place is safe. The second person would reply through signals to inform the first that he is not being monitored. The signals are agreed upon previously and should not cause suspicion.
c. A second signal for getting acquainted is one in which the arriving person uses while sitting down. That signal may be a certain clause, a word, a sentence, or a gesture agreed upon previously, and should not cause suspicion for those who hear it or see it.
B. The Meeting Stage: The following measures should be taken:
1. Caution during the meeting.
2. Not acting unnaturally during the meeting in order not to raise suspicion.
3. Not talking with either loud or very low voices (moderate).
4. Not writing anything that has to do with the meeting.
5. Agreeing on a security plan in case the enemy raids the location.
C. After the Meeting: The following measures should be taken:
1. Not departing together, but each one seperately.
2. Not heading directly to the main road but through secondary ones.
3. Not leaving anything in the meeting place that might indicate the identity or nature of those who met.
Meeting in-person has disadvantages, such as:
1. Allowing the enemy to capture those who are meeting.
2. Allowing them to take pictures of those who are meeting, record their conversation, and gather evidence against them.
3. Revealing the appearance of the commander to the other person. However, that may be avoided by taking the previously mentioned measures such as disguising himself well and changing his appearance (glasses, wigs, etc.)
THIRD MEANS: THE MESSENGER
This is an intermediary between the sender and the receiver. The messenger should possess all characteristics mentioned in the first chapter regarding the Military Organization's member. These are the security measures that a messenger should take:
1. Knowledge of the person to whom he will deliver the message.
2. Agreement on special signals, exact date, and specific time.
3. Selecting a public street or place that does not raise suspicion.
4. Going through a secondary road that does not have check points.
5. Using public transportation (train, bus, etc) and disembarking before the main station. Likewise, embarking should not be done at the main station either, where there are a lot of security personnel and informants.
6. Complete knowledge of the location to which he is going.
FOURTH MEANS: LETTERS
Letters may be used as a method of communication between members and the Organization provided that the following security measures are taken:
1. It is forbidden to write any secret information in the letter. If one must do so, the writing should be done in general terms.
2. The letter should not be mailed from a post office to the sender's residence, but from a distant one.
3. The letter should not be sent directly to the receiver's address but to an inconspicuous location where there are many workers from your country. Afterward, the letter will be forwarded to the intended receiver (this is regarding the overseas-bound letter).
4. The sender's name and address on the envelope should be fictitious. In case the letters and their contents are discovered, the security apparatus would not be able to determine his name and address.
5. The envelope should not be transparent so as to reveal the letter inside.
6. The enclosed pages should not be many, so as not to raise suspicion.
7. The receiver's address should be written clearly so that the letter would not be returned.
8. Paying the post office box fees should not be forgotten.
FIFTH MEANS: FACSIMILE AND WIRELESS
Considering its modest capabilities and the pursuit by the security apparatus of its members and forces, the Islamic Military Organization cannot obtain these devices. In case the Organization is able to obtain them, firm security measures should be taken to secure communication between the members in the country and the command outside. These measures are:
1. The duration of the transmission should not exceed five minutes in order to prevent the enemy from pinpointing the device location.
2. The device should be placed in a location with high wireless frequency, such as close to a TV station, embassies, and consulates in order to prevent the enemy from identifying its location.
3. The brother, using the wireless device to contact his command outside the country, should disguise his voice.
4. The time of communication should be carefully specified.
5. The frequency should be changed from time to time.
6. The device should be frequently moved from one location to another.
7. Do not reveal your location to the entity for which you report.
8. The conversation should be in general terms so as not to raise suspicion.
TRANSPORTATION MEANS
The members of the Organization may move from one location to another using one of the following means:
a. Public transportation & b. Private transportation
Security Measures that Should be Observed in Public Transportation:
1. One should select public transportation that is not subject to frequent checking along the way, such as crowded trains or public buses.
2. Boarding should be done at a secondary station, as main stations undergo more careful surveillance. Likewise, embarkment should not be done at main stations.
3. The cover should match the general appearance (tourist bus, first-class train, second-class train, etc.)
4. The existence of documents supporting the cover.
5. Placing important luggage among the passengers' luggage without identifying the one who placed it. If it is discovered, its owner would not be arrested. In trains, it should be placed in a different car than that of the owner.
6.The brother traveling on a 'special mission' should not get involved in religious issues (advocating good or denouncing evil) or day-to-day matters (seat reservation . . .)
7. The brother traveling on a mission should not arrive in the destination country at night because then travelers are few, and there are security parties and check points along the way.
8. When cabs are used, conversation of any kind should not be started with the driver because many cab drivers work for the security apparatus.
9. The brother should exercise extreme caution and apply all security measures to the members.
SECURITY MEASURES RELATED TO PRIVATE TRANSPORTATION
Private transportation includes: cars, motorcycles
A. Cars and motorcycles used in overt activity:
1. One should possess the proper permit and not violate traffic rules in order to avoid trouble with the police.
2. The location of the vehicle should be secure so that the security apparatus would not confiscate it.
3. The vehicle make and model should be appropriate for the brother's cover.
4. The vehicle should not be used in special military operations unless the Organization has no other choice.
B. Cars and motorcycles used in covert activity:
1. Attention should be given to permits and the traffic rules in order to avoid trouble and reveal their actual mission.
2. The vehicle should not be left in suspicious places (deserts, mountains). If it must be, then the work should be performed at suitable times when no one would keep close watch or follow it.
3. The vehicle should be purchased using forged documents sot that getting to its owners would be prevented once it is discovered.
4. For the sake of continuity, have only one brother in charge of selling.
5. While parking somewhere, one should be in a position to move quickly and flee in case of danger.
6. The car or motorcycle color should be changed before the operation and returned to the original after the operation.
7. The license plate number and country name should be falsified. Further. The digits should be numerous in order to prevent anyone from spotting and memorizing them.
8. The operation vehicle should not be taken to large gasoline stations so that it would not be detected by the security apparatus.



Third world regimes in Algeria and Egypt do not have the strict separation of authority between federal and local police forces, or the inclination to respect individual rights. Informers are on each block, in each mosque, in each apartment building, and often times on each floor. The level of care encouraged for communications may be overstated, but is not without premise.

Again, there appears to be a new contributing editor, as the instructions are enumerated and sectioned in a manner not yet introduced. That the manual was written in the early 90's is most clearly demonstrated in the notable absence of instructions related to email, cyphered websites, compact discs, calling cards, wireless telephones, pagers, et al.

Not surprisingly, tape-recorded messages and video recordings with explicit instructions are not used as communication tools. Those mediums may be used for religious propaganda as they were by the Ayatollah Khomeni prior to the Iranian Revolution. This form of communication is an example of overt operations: while aiding the mission of the organization, there is no pressing need to conceal its content or message.

Communication is undertaken to relay the status of, and pertinent instructions related to, an operation. The preferred mode of communication for a cell in a specific area of operation is word-of-mouth, in person. While this raises the possibility that the operatives will be spotted, AQ is confident in its agents' ability to devise innocuous cover stories/identities. Particularly after being encouraged to adopt a likely cover, it is odd that the examples given continue to portray a professional class.

Common communication will be used during the PLANNING STAGE of an op, while standby communication is more likely to be delivered via coded messages on telephones, letters, or, more recently, with internet tools during the PRE-OPERATIONAL/POST-OPERATIONAL STAGES. Alarm communications will be used if a mission in PREOP STAGE is compromised and the chain of command and control is broken.

The commanding officer dictates the mode of communication because, if the subordinate has been 'turned,' then the commanding officer stands the risk of being caught.

'Significant technological advances' would include the wheel, if the Islamists had their way. The paranoia that surrounds telephone use is rational given the ease that phones can be tapped, but is excessive in that the 'security apparatus' lacks the resources to monitor virtually all phone use in a country. The leadership needs to encourage as much paranoia, caution, and fear of detection as possible, particularly in Moslem nations, where the penalty for subversive activity is much greater than in the West.

That the rules for the foot soldier are different than that for the leadership is evidenced in the ability of Western counterintelligence agencies to pinpoint Bin Laden's position in Afghanistan by tracking his satellite phone. This manual was written long before the advent of satellite phones, so it is amazing that the most basic tenet of communication was ignored by the leader of the Organization.

Evidently, AQ had not heard of Echelon, the omniscient communications spy tool that can scan virtually every single phone call, email, download, and satellite transmission on the planet. It has been estimated that Echelon may monitor up to three billion such transactions daily.

The use of Echelon is primarily to target specific transmissions, to pinpoint phone locations, computer servers, and communication devices once they have been used, and once the intelligence agent knows what to look for. Consider how useful it was in preventing September 11, 2001, for example, and how effective it has been in hunting down the leadership of AQ. It is impossible to predict from a universe of possibilities what may occur, difficult to track events as they occur, but infinitely possible to piece together once they've occurred.

Many, many well-meaning civil libertarians are petrified that the government will use the full weight of its power to peer into every aspect of our lives, and to use that information to deprive us of our freedoms. That the Department of Defense would attempt to predict terrorist behaviour via Total Information Awareness is troubling stuff. Consider how well DOD did when a depressed pilot flew his plane into the side of New York Mountain in 1997. Replete with the most advanced communication systems and transponders available on the planet, the A-10 plane is an enormous hunk of metal whose trajectory flew it straight at NORAD (our ballistic-missile warning radar) headquarters in Colorado. Still, it took the complete efforts of our military nearly a month to locate that wreckage.

Perhaps this is why the emphasis on communication is to practice the simple tenets of secrecy: say little, and be careful with what one says. Chances are good that one is not being monitored, but one should always behave as if one were. The 'tyrant's' machine is powerful, but NOT omniscient.

Covert agents will be demanding and specific about the communication devices they use, whether they are wireless or pagers or calling cards. Particularly when setting up wireless accounts or other phone service, false names will certainly be used. If deposits are required, they will be paid and collected when able. The cost of the service will most definitely be an issue; international calling will be secondary to the ability to send text messages or mobile e-mail.

If one is in a position to notice trends on a suspect, this data may be helpful: a ten-year average of wireless use indicates the typical phone call lasts three billable minutes (2.45 or thereabouts). Paid phone calls average 3-6 billable minutes. Internet calls average 20 minutes. Local phone calls on a landline are about 4 minutes. The operative's calls will last less, possibly far less, than these averages.

Person-to-person meetings will also be brief and to the point. Stationary meetings are those that would occur in a safe house. The need to reconnoiter the meeting place is to give the appearance of familiarity and to plot escape routes. Embarking on the final leg of the journey to the meeting some distance from the actual meeting place is to watch for tails.

Non-stationary meetings are those held away from a safe house, under the premise of a business meeting.

The assumption is that the operatives are being watched and are suspected of being subversives. The predilection to believe so is overstated, possibly because the author himself had a known history himself with radical groups and was projecting his own experiences. If this is so, the advice regarding escape is meaningless, designed to lend hope where there is none. If an agent is under observation, security forces would not initiate a raid without enough men to successfully capture their target.

* * *

"OK, class, this concludes the section on meetings, next we will . . . yes, Ahmed?"
"Sir, I . . . uh . . . was wondering what to do if we get raided during the meeting."
"Raided?"
"Say Samir and I were meeting at Tabouli's Gyro Shack, and the regime's kaffirs tried to take us into custody?"
['I pray we have given you cyanide, fool!'] "OH! I see. Well, obviously, you will be able to outsmart them with . . . architectural documents and, uh, pretend you are having a, uh, design meeting, yes, that's it. And if you are verrry careful you will be able to tell you are being followed."
"That's it? Architectural documents? The only schooling I have is madrasa! Are you sure that cover will work?"
"Yes! Class dismissed. Except YOU Ahmed, I think YOU will be . . . travelling soon."

* * *

The in-person meetings will typically involve the commander of a cell and one of his cell's operatives. Remember, cell members are kept in isolation from its other members as protection should any be compromised. If two suspects are conversing, it is a simple matter to determine the higher ranking officer: he will either set the date/place/signal or otherwise take the lead in directing the operative to do so.

It is a sad state of affairs when, in this age of terrorism, drug wars, and organized crime, that terrorist identification is either a joke or nonexistent. It is incredible that every security firm in America capable of doing so does not publish some basic techniques, suggestions, or the like on their website to assist counter-terrorism efforts.

Even the Rand 'Corporation,' whose primary source of funding is TAX DOLLARS, SELLS ITS EXPERTISE for defeating our common enemy! If this is capitalism, stop the bus, I want off. This is selling life jackets on a sinking ship, an airline pilot leaving the cockpit and trolling the cabin for tips as the craft approaches a thunderstorm. Where is the outrage when one sees former 'intelligence officers' on television, spouting seminal observations while on the dole of tax-financed 'think tanks'?

thetulsan.com was conceived following September 11, 2001 as a means of projecting an essay written to identify the stages of a terrorist operation. The site's structure was designed to compliment the logic of the National Threat Level (oooooooh NOW you get it!). To rise close to the top of the internet for information on the 'Al Queda Training Manual' defies logic.

The actions of the operatives will also defy logic. Agents attending a meeting will betray a level of agitation or standoffishness that is without merit. If asked any gentle probing questions, may become particularly agitated, but will most likely be notable by a lack of emotion, by their stiffness and unease. The agent will be prone to checking his watch, scanning his surroundings more than other patrons, and will invariably ask for simple directions.

Once the meeting is underway, the participants' rigidity and discomfort may be fairly obvious. Decorum will be observed, but the warmth displayed will make a dentist's office look like a family gathering. It will be a short affair, marked by the lack of note-taking or the exchange of documents typical of most business meetings. If at a restaurant, frugality and dietary concerns may be observed.

Poor operatives! They cannot talk on the phone without being listened to, they cannot meet in person without being observed . . . whatever is a poor agent to do? One is surprised that djinns are not used to float between operatives.

Lacking djinns, here we are introduced to a new class of operative: the Messenger. This accomplice is not a member of the Organization, but is possibly being groomed for recruitment. He will act overtly, without a cover story, and will have been closely observed and vetted by the Organization. The messenger's job will afford him the opportunity and cover to travel widely in the area, and may be employed as a taxi driver, deliveryman, mechanical contractor, or the like.

Like most other pieces of bad advice in the Manual, the messenger section is absurdly inadequate, and serves no purpose but to further confuse the trainee. The messenger will be used during the planning phases of an operation, less likely during the pre-operational phase.

The use of letters will employ code words, be lacking in professional polish if the cover is 'business,' and be coldly formal if the premise is familial or friendly. As suggested, the return address will most likely be a real address, but not belonging to the sender. Again, the advice raises more flags: fictitious address, travelling to a distant post office, non-matching information between return address and signatory. The anxious operative may forego posting the letter and, as they believe they are impervious to detection, actually make detailed, repetitious inquiry of the postal worker regarding the amount of the postage due.

The main body of recruits for the Organization is the working class. That the manual was designed for operatives in the Kingdom of Sa'ud evidenced in the reference to 'workers from your country.' Letters may go to general delivery stations, mosques, fraternal organizations, schools, etc.

Many years ago, employed at a location previously owned by an international petrochemical company, this writer came into possession of a letter sent to the defunct company from an Iranian business. No flowery stamp on this letter: young boy throwing rock through the Star of David. Subtlety is not the fascists strong point.

Before the term wireless was used to denote PCS (personal communication services), it meant ham radios, shortwave systems, citizen's band, and the like. Even with the best detection equipment, it is difficult to narrow down the location of a transmission, but child's play to listen in on.

More likely in third world countries, radios require antennae, fuses, microphones, vacuum tubes, and many other specialty items to maintain. Operatives may purchase these items abroad and have them shipped to members using the devices. Suppliers should probe for enthusiasm present in a supposed hobbyist versus the cold inquiry of a wa-hobbyist. Under the guise of enhancing additional sales, suspicious suppliers should probe the nature of the business to check the legitimacy of the 'business.'

Ask actor James Woods about how 'brothers' on a 'mission' may behave: SUSPICIOUSLY. Mr. Woods obeyed his instincts, and alerted the airplane crew. Actors are students of behavior, and Woods, bored with the flight, started observing fellow passengers. If the agents had been in the mission's Operational/Execution Phase, Mr. Woods would probably not have noticed as they would have taken control as he was still settling in.

Terrorists will typically buy tickets closer to the day of the trip than other passengers, paying cash or with a new credit card. They may insist on specific seating arrangements (despite the manual's advice), and book a one-way trip. They may not carry any luggage, and will be nervous. If engaged in conversation, they may either curtly dismiss the overture, or seek to move altogether. If travelling together, they will communicate reservedly, purposefully.

On the bus or plane, the agent will, as in Mr. Woods' case, closely observe the activities of the crew, and eschew contact with fellow passengers. They may fidget repeatedly with a part of their clothing or baggage, seek eye contact with accomplices on board, and make repeated inquiries of the flight crew.

If there is any problem with the reservations, the advice not to make an issue of this will be right out the window and one should expect the agent to assert himself, sometimes vociferously. If the transportation worker is a woman, especially, who stands between him and the mission, one can anticipate a heated exchange and bullying.

Operatives tend to be bad drivers, as this Google search demonstrates. The single greatest level of contact between the public and the 'security apparatus' is through traffic enforcement. Even Tim McVeigh was caught because of a traffic violation. In the days preceding WTCI, Ramsi Yousef's cell was involved in two traffic accidents.

Overt activity is by definition innocuous fare that should be easily explained away. It is NOT easy to explain away a forged license plate, title, or insurance papers, so the BAD ADVICE pile grows with the suggestion to procure the vehicle with forged documents.

Covert use of vehicles includes surveillance missions and delivery of explosives to the staging/target area. The BAD ADVICE pile grows larger still with the suggestion to REPAINT THE VEHICLE and to use false license tags. Agents are likely to utilize rental vehicles in their own names, paying and collecting whatever deposits are required. The van used in WTCI was reported stolen, the police given false license tags.

Rental agencies should be vigilant with all identification necessary, and give close observation to suspect vehicles for traces of chemical residues, forged credit card receipts, and manipulation of any vehicle identification. Car dealers may experience 'direct-buy' or 'sight-unseen' purchases; agents are likely to produce false identification for these transactions, and to exercise buyer's remorse rights than other purchasers.


SIXTH LESSON: TRAINING
The following security measures should be taken during training:
The place should have the following specifications:
1. Distance from the populated areas with the availability of living necessities.
2. Availability of medical services during the training.
3. The place should be suitable for the type of training (physical fitness, shooting, tactics).
4. No one except the trainers and trainees should know about the place.
5. The place should have many roads and entrances.
6. The place should be visited at suitable times.
7. Hiding any traces of the training immediately afterward.
8. Guarding the place during the training.
9. Appropriateness of the existing facilities for the number of training members.
10. Exclusion of anyone who is not connected with the training.
11. Taking all security measures regarding the establishment.
12. Distance of the place from police stations, public establishments, and the eyes of informants.
13. The place should not be situated in such a way that the training and trainees can be seen from another location.
The Trainees
1. Before proceeding to the training place, all security measures connected with an undercover individual should be taken. Meanwhile, during training at the place, personnel safety should be ensured.
2. Selecting the trainees carefully.
3. The trainees should not know one another.
4. The small size of groups that should be together during the training (7-10) individuals).
5. The trainees should not know the training place.
6. Establishing a training plan for each trainee.
The Trainers
All measures taken with regard to the commanders apply also to the trainers. Also, the following should be applied:
1. Fewness of the trainers in the training place. Only those conducting the training should be there, in order not to subject the training team to the risk of security exposure.
2. Not revealing the identity of the trainer to the trainees.
3. Keeping a small ratio of trainees to trainer.
4. The training team members should not know one another.


Training is encouraged in areas 'away from the population.' We Americans are so thankful this advice is offered aspiring agents: nothing attracts the rural American like the sound of sporadic gunfire in the woods. Landowners detect the presence of gun-toting trespassers with the accuracy of a bloodhound tracking a bleeding bear with bells around its neck.

But alas, the training referred to here is not necessarily the 'boot-camp' of Afghanistan fame. Training can include role-playing, language skills, markmanship, hand to hand combat, driving, introduction to new devices, counterfeiting, or whatever other ancillary skills members are required to possess for their role in the cell. Company/battalion-sized training camps will NOT be found in the United States, but are likely in South America. Operatives will co-train with rebel factions and take advantage of 'retreats' and large, rural estates in third world nations.

Members of the military branch of the Organization will keep themselves in decent physical condition, and may enroll in self-defense classes, martial arts training, and other non-lethal forms of hand-to-hand combat training. They will most likely engage in this training singularly.

It is unlikely that agents will seek the assistance of private tactical training/simulation schools/agencies as they did pre-September 11. Small arms and munitions will either be smuggled in, purchased in discreet amounts via accomplices in conjunction with other criminal enterprises, or stolen as tactical operations/exercises.

'Trainees' will be as closely screened as a delusional, seventh-century enterprise can perform. Trainees are isolated from corrupting influences, watched for idealogical purity, and subjected to loyalty/obedience tests. They may depart suddenly for an unannounced destination, refuse to discuss the nature of the class, or in discussing the class do so in a general, vague way. A personality change will be in order, as the agent incorporates the fatalism inherent in the apocalyptic worldview of the Organization.

Trainers with combat experience are highly valued, so may include veterans of the Russo-Afghan War, Chechnya, the Phillipines, Israel, and any of the Iraqi conflicts.


SEVENTH LESSON: WEAPONS: MEASURES RELATED TO BUYING AND TRANSPORTING THEM
Prior to dealing with weapons, whether buying, transporting, or storing them, it is essential to establish a careful, systematic and firm security plan that deals with all stages. It is necessary to divide that task into stages: First Stage: Prior to Purchase; Second Stage: Purchasing; Third Stage: Transport; Fourth Stage: Storage.
Prior to Purchase Stage:
a. In-depth knowledge of the place where weapons will be purchased, together with its entrances and exits.
b. Verifying there are no informants or security personnel at the place where purchasing will take place.
c. The place should be far from police stations and government establishments.
d. Not proceeding to the purchasing place directly by the main road, but on secondary streets.
e. Performing the exercises to detect surveillance.
f. One's appearance and clothing should be appropriate for the place where purchasing will take place.
g. The purchasing place should not be situated in such a way that the seller and buyer can be seen from another location. To the contrary, the purchasing place should be such that the seller and buyer can see the surrounding area.
h. Determining a suitable cover for being in that place.
i. The place should not be crowded because that would facilitate the police hiding among people, monitoring the arms receiving, and consequently arresting the brother purchasing.
j. In case one of the parties is unable to arrive, it is essential to prearrange an alternative place and time with the seller.
k. Selecting a time suitable for the purchase that does not raise suspicion.
l. Prior to purchasing, the seller should be tested to ensure that he is not an agent of the security apparatus.
m. Preparing a place for storage prior to purchasing.
The Purchase Stage:
a. Verifying that the weapons are in working condition.
b. Not paying the seller the price for the weapons before viewing, inspecting, and testing them.
c. Not telling the seller the mission for which the weapons are being purchased.
d. Extreme caution should be used during the purchasing operation in the event of any unnatural behavior by the seller or those around you.
e. Not lengthening the time spent with the seller. It is important to depart immediately after purchasing the weapon.
Transport Stage:
a. Avoid main roads where check points are common.
b. Choose a suitable time for transporting the weapons.
c. Observers should proceed on the road ahead of the transportation vehicle for early warning in case of an emergency.
d. Not proceeding directly to the storage place until after verifying there is no surveillance.
e. During the transport stage, weapons should be hidden in a way that are inconspicuous and difficult to find.
f. The route for transporting the weapons should be determined very carefully.
g. Verifying the legality of the vehicle, performing its maintenance, checking its gasoline and water levels etc.
h. Driving the car normally in order to prevent accidents.
Storage Stage:
a. In order to avoid repeated transporting, suitable storage places should be selected. In case the materials are bombs or detonators, they should be protected from extreme heat and humidity.
b. Explosive materials and detonators should be separated and stored apart from each other.
c. Caution should be exercised when putting detonators in the arsenal.
d. Lubricating the weapons and placing them in wooden or plastic crates. The ammunition should be treated likewise.
When selecting an arsenal, consider the following:
1. The arsenal should not be in well-protected areas, or close to parks or public places.
2. The arsenal should not be in a "no-man's land."
3. The arsenal should not be in an apartment previously used for suspicious activities and often frequented by security personnel.
4. The arsenal should not be a room that is constantly used and cannot be given up by family members who do not know the nature of the father or husband's work.
5. The apartment selected as an arsenal should be owned by the Organization or rented on a long-term basis.
6. The brother responsible for storage should not visit the arsenal frequently, nor toy with the weapons.
7. The arsenal keeper should record in a book all weapons, explosive materials, and ammunition. That book should be coded and well secured.
8. Only the arsenal keeper and the commander should know the location of the arsenal.
9. It is necessary to prepare alternative arsenals and not leave any leads in the original arsenal to the alternative ones.


Again, we are reminded that the Organization's agents are simply following orders. Dealing with illegal arms is the most dangerous form of criminal activity, and the most likely to be infiltrated by government agents. So here the advice is given in the context of a done deal; who to contact, what type of weapons, how to negotiate the price, how to get the money: all unmentioned because those details have been taken care of by Upper Management. The chief concern of command is that the seller is not an undercover agent, the weapons appear to work, the agents do not break or lose the goods.

The seller of weapons to the Organization will be 1) government officials on the take, 2) well-established black marketeers, or 3) organized crime rings. The Organization has specially trained covert members who will use these three channels to procure goods, raise funds, and further identify weak points in the country's defenses.

1. Personnel in receiving/shipment departments of the military, custom, or government offices will be asked to look the other way, threatened with retaliation, bribed, suddenly reassigned without cause, asked to verify that certain equipment is indeed missing. Receipts, packing slips, any paperwork that should confirm arrival of the shipment will be missing, altered, or forged.

2) The third world's economy thrives on the black market (which is more gray than anything.) Businessmen who supply the black market are more adept at procuring goods and services than either the government or 'legitimate businesses.' Black marketeers will know what ships are coming in, what routes smugglers will take, who to bribe with how much, et al. If they suspect they are dealing with the Organization, may become uncooperative as sources of information to authorities, misleading with the information they provide, and alter their business practices/storage areas.

3) Organized crime rings are, by definition, black marketeers. Enterprises that specialise in counterfeiting, smuggling, and credit card theft are likely accomplices for supplying weapons for the organization. Aligning itself with the Organization may be signaled with a change in leadership, or the division of the ring into smaller groups.

The context for procuring the weapons may be to support another criminal enterprise (credit card theft, bank robbery), but the swelling ranks of young, emboldened men committed to Jihad is growing, and the Organization probably makes its case directly for weapons. 'Not telling the seller the mission' suggests that the seller is aware of the terror link, but that the specifics should not be discussed to protect the mission's integrity.

It is surprising that the operative is not given advice in the event he is stopped by the security apparatus. The most likely event is, of course, that the excitable young chap will violate a simple traffic law of one sort or another, and draw the attention of the authorities.

On roadways preceding checkpoints, security personnel should be vigilant of two or more cars 'broken down' within sight of the checkpoint or shortly after a sign announcing its presence. A passenger may insist on needing to retrieve something from the road behind them, or be let off just before the checkpoint and begin heading back down the road.

The members may be nervous, but will quietly go along with a thorough search. Without betraying their ties with terror, the members could be mistaken for any smugglers on a run. All this depends, of course, on exactly where the seizure takes place and what the weapons are: on a lonely road to Riyadh or in the vicinity around the Grand Mosque; rifles and ammunition versus C4 and detonator caps.

The Organization will be composed of single, young men, so the obvious spot for an arsenal is where it would seem least likely. The author lists the places NOT to put the arsenal, while the most secure spot is only briefly mentioned: a family man's large house, where his rule is absolute and inviolable; where howls of protest and denials will be issued by a chorus of the suspect's children and and wife.

Weapons will be stored until needed for specific operations or as conditions warrant. Knowing what assets are available to perform a given task is essential, and the Organization authorizes a written account of mission-related work for the first time here. Because of this, and the aforementioned preference for arsenal, only the most senior, trusted members will be holders of the arsenal.


COMMON ISLAMIC TERMS & CONCEPTS
(Google quickie search for Islamic terms and concepts)

AL
capitalized ('Al') means family, clan, tribe; smaller case ('al') is used as definitive article
ALLAH
Moslem term for God
ANQUDS
'bunch of grapes,' geographic branches of organization
AZAN
Call to worship, broadcast from the minuret five times a day
CALIPHATE
a unified Moslem political State encompassing all countries of Islamic persuasion. Idealized after the political state created in the wake of the Prophet's death by a succession of three rulers, after which two groups assumed legitimacy, later settling into two main groups, the Shi'ia and the Sun'nis.
CALIPH
'Successor,' the leader of the Caliphate, endowed with supreme political, military, and religious authority.
DA'WA
the Call to Islam
DHIMMI
'protected people,' or a non-Moslem believer (Christian, Jew) 'free' to practice their religion in a country adhering to sharia
EMIR/AMIR
'prince' or high-ranking commander/general
FATWAH
an order issued by a religious authority
FEDAYEEN
he who sacrifices himself
FIAHS
compartmentalized cell structure
HADD
punishment as dictated by Islamic law
HAFIZ
one who has memorized the Koran
HAJJ
pilgrimage to Mecca that all able Moslems are required to perform
HAWAJA
informal banking system
HOURIS
angelic figures that accompany observant Muslims to Paradise, typified as comely women
IBN
son of
IKHWAN
Brothers; name used by Islamist Saudi soldiers in early 20th century.
IMAM
'he who goes in front' of their fellow Moslems to lead them in prayer
INFIDEL
one who rejects Islam
ISLAM
literally 'submission to Allah's will'
JAHILYA
false, apostate Moslems
KAFFIR
ungrateful unbeliever, polytheist
KUFFIR
damned dirty kaffir
MADRASA
school for teaching rote memorization of Koran
MAJLIS al SHURA
an advisory council
MAJLIS
derived from the Arabic 'yajlis' ('he sits down'); a sitting room, a reception area
MUJAHID
Islamic warriors
NATION OF ISLAM
African-American branch of Moslems that follow the teachings of Elijah Mohammed; regarding by rest of Moslem world as jahilya.
the ORGANIZATION
pseudonym used by Al Queda when referring to itself
PROPHET
Mohhamed
QU'RAN
Alternate spelling of Koran
RAMADAN
holy month of fasting during daylight hours
SALAAM
'Peace Be upon you.'
SALAF
of the first three generations of Moslem believers (companions, followers, followers of followers)
SALAFIST
sect of Moslems seeking Moslem unity based on the earliest practices and teachings of Islam
SHARIA
Islamic law as prescribed by the Koran and Sunnah
SHEIK
literally 'elder,' but used now to denote anyone with authority
SUNNI
sect of Moslems that take a narrow interpretation of Islam based on the Sunnah, emphasizing the legitimacy of religious dictates within a very limited number of Imam's and sources
SURA
advisory body of trusted leaders
TAQIYYA
dispensation allowing the concealment of one's religion; forgoing one's religious obligations, when one is under compulsion or threat
WAHABBISM
"At the end of the second part of the book Al-Usul al-arba'a fi tardid al-Wahhabiyya, Hadrat Hakim as-Sirhindi al-Mujaddidi writes: 'The Wahhabis and the non-madhhabite people cannot comprehend the meanings of 'majaz' (allegory, symbol) and 'isti'ara' (metaphor)'" THERE! WELL SAID!
ZAKAT
2.5% tithe required to be given to poor Moslems